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1. Introduction
Human capital is a crucial factor that determines productivity o f a country and is a key 
engine of economic growth. For employers it is an important factor that influences the 
competitive position on the product market. For employees human capital investment 
improves their position on the labour market and is an important determinant of 
individuals’ earning capacity and employability. Education is also associated with other 
personnel and social welfare benefits, including greater happiness, better health and 
greater longevity (see e.g. Booth and Snower 1996; Temple 2001; Ok and Tergeist 2003). 
Human capital formation concerns initial education and maintenance, company training. 
Underinvestment in general and firm-specific human capital is a reality. In this paper 
fostering education and training, i.e. workers' employability is motivated on theoretical 
grounds and on practical grounds. The paper explores which institutions are essential 
explaining factors for the scope, the participation, the content and the quality of education 
and general and specific company training. The focus is on the industrial relations system 
and the daily practice o f bookkeeping in private enterprises and the government budget. 
Some practical policy solutions are brought forward to consider and treat education and 
training more like real investments and to bridge the existing gap between human capital 
theory and accounting practice, and to improve the quality o f decision making related to 
education and training.
2. Theoretical importance of human capital
Not only in the human resource management literature also according to the human 
capital theory and the endogenous growth theory human capital is an important 
determinant of competitiveness of economies and individual firms. The human resource 
management theory starts from the notion that employees with their effort and dedication 
and qualities are the key to success and the most important production factor of an 
enterprise (see e.g. Bratton and Gold 2003). The workforce constitutes a vital and 
valuable organisational asset. Capabilities must be developed, knowledge must be
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acquired, maintained and renewed and shared in order to reinforce competitiveness and 
enhance performance of organisations.
Following economists like Mincer (1958), Becker (1964) and Schultz (1961) ‘human 
capital’ is a common word used in social sciences as well as daily life. Human capital 
refers to all acquired characteristics of workers that make them more productive. Human 
capital is acquired through formal education prior to entrance in the labour market (initial 
schooling), and after entrance in the labour market via on-the-job training, learning by 
doing or courses and/or experience. Parallel to the definition o f durable means of 
production, i.e. fixed assets, human capital is seen as a stock of skills, knowledge and 
experience or a bundle of achievements/performances that generate a stream of income, 
i.e. productive capacity.1 Post-school learning accounts for one third to one half o f all 
skill formation in a modern economy (Heckman 2000).
Central in the human capital theory is the preposition that an employee with a higher 
educational attainment possesses more capacities and hence a higher labour productivity 
than a lower educated employee. The human being is not considered to be a machine, but 
is seen as a capital good and the expenditure on schooling and training are considered a 
kind o f investment. Many economic analyses o f education and training are derived from 
the investment theory in economic science. The amount of investment in education and 
training is based on weighing costs and benefits: expected investment (time and money, 
forgone wage) and the present value o f the expected benefits (productivity and wage). In 
the first instance it concerns for most the micro-economic importance of human capital 
for the individual employer and the individual employee. Financial returns are the 
incentive for training. Job training is either the result of a choice by the worker or by the 
worker and his employer.
1 The analogy between schooling and training of an individual and investment in machinery goes 
back to Adam Smith: “A man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any those 
employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill may be compared to one of those 
expensive machines.” (A. Smith 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, Chapter X, Part 1 (2), The Modern Library, New York, 1937).
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There is no asset market for human capital. This is related to the abolition o f slavery and 
indentured servitude. Workers are not owned by the firm and cannot be sold. Property 
rights are a key issue that distinguishes human capital from physical capital. People 
cannot sell rights to their future labour earnings to lenders in order to secure financing for 
their human capital investments (Heckman 2000). Human capital is intangible. Human 
capital is an atypical good: its volume and value do not diminish when it is used. On the 
contrary, by using it its volume and its value increase. Other important differences 
between physical and human capital are that workers can leave a firm or are able to 
strike, may be absent or incumbent workers are able to shirk. As a result investment in 
human capital is more uncertain than investments in physical capital. This explains why a 
considerable part of the costs of education are paid by the state. Also the collective good 
feature of training, i.e. externalities justify subsidies to training.
Becker’s (1964) theory o f investment in human capital is a neoclassical equilibrium 
theory. He presupposes a perfect market. Those who invest in human capital act 
rationally, external effects do not exist and market failures do not occur. Initial education 
and training are considered substitutes, implying that the lack of initial training in the 
early years can be compensated by further training in the adolescent years. Firms invest 
in specific training while employees are mainly interested in general training. General 
human capital involves skills that are of equal value in many different organisations, for 
instance a widely used word processing program. General training also increases the 
productivity o f the worker in other firms. Specific human capital involves skills that are 
of value only to a single employer, either because he is a monopolist, i.e. the only user of 
that type of worker, or because of special methods, routines, and equipment with which 
workers must become familiar. Specific training cannot be used gainfully in other firms, 
i.e. does not influence the outside option wage. Hence, according to Becker (1964) all 
training which can be used by more than one specific firm or institution is in principle 
general. This makes specific training an empty box (Stern and Ritzen 1991). Becker’s 
distinction is crucial in defining who bears the investment costs. In a perfect market the 
wage rate rise is exactly equal to the increase in marginal productivity. If  firms try to 
appropriate part of the returns on general training, the trained employee would quit and
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go to work elsewhere. Workers are willing to pay these costs since it raises future wages. 
Hence it is the trainee not the firm who bears the costs of general training and profits 
from the returns. They may pay for general training through a lower wage during the 
training period (Becker 1964; Leuven 2005). Firm specific investments require the 
sharing of initial costs and future returns between employee and employer to give both 
parties an incentive to continue the employment relation. From the human capital theory 
is follows that uncertainty about the return will result in sharing costs and benefits of 
investments in specific human capital. Employers are not prepared to pay the full 
company training because o f the risk that the employee will change job after completion 
of the training and the investment disappears. The employee is not willing to bare the full 
costs because of the risk to be fired and the investment becomes valueless. Moreover, 
investment in specific human capital creates rents to continuing a relationship, which the 
parties can bargain over (Hashimoto 1981; Leuven, 2005). Firms will concentrate their 
specific investments on workers whose expected likelihood of staying is perceived to be 
higher. To avoid quits firms are willing to pay the trained worker a wage higher than the 
outside option, but below the worker’s productivity.
Investments in human capital have an impact on the productivity level through the 
‘worker effect’ and the ‘allocative effect’ as well as on productivity growth through the 
‘diffusion effect’ and the ‘research effect’ (see Corvers 1999). The ‘worker effect’ refers 
to the positive marginal productivity o f education with respect to the production of a 
particular good, i.e. better educated are more efficient in working with the resources at 
hand. The ‘allocative effect’ concerns the greater (allocative) efficiency o f better 
educated workers in allocating all input factors to the production process between 
alternative uses. Not only the choice o f inputs, also the choice of the outputs and the 
choice of the production processes improve. The ‘diffusion effect’ refers to the fact that 
better educated workers are more able to adapt to technological change and will introduce 
new production techniques more quickly and more successfully. The ‘research effect’ 
refers to the role of higher education as an important input factor in research and 
development. It implies that technological progress is not exogenous given, but is driven
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by investments in human capital. The latter two effects suggest complementarity between 
technological change and human capital.
Besides the micro-economic importance of human capital there also is macro-economic 
importance of human capital. Since the introduction of the human capital theory there is 
much interest in the effects of education and training on the economic growth of a 
country. Human capital is an important input factor for research and development in 
many endogenous growth models. In the endogenous growth theory o f economists like 
Nelson and Phelps (1966), Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) economic growth is most of 
all determined by the volume of investment (accumulation) in human capital (knowledge 
and skills) and physical capital (stock of capital goods). Participation in the production 
process not only results in goods, it also may result in inventions that can be used in the 
future. Such learning effects are stronger for educated people or people with more 
capacities. Technological innovations and investments in knowledge (education and 
learning by doing) in firm X also have an impact on the productivity in other firms. These 
external spill-over effects result in positive scale effects (Acemoglu 1996; Trostel 2004). 
For a review of the growth effects of education see Temple (2001). The endogenous 
growth theory not only is able to explain why an economy of a country moves towards a 
higher growth path, also why the economic growth rates of countries differ permanently. 
The endogenous growth theory implies that it is possible by means of (government) 
policy to permanently increase the speed o f growth o f the economy. Hence good quality 
vocational training and qualitative high valued education and training and educational 
policy are very important for future economic development and employment. There is a 
(policy) dilemma between knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion. Mobility o f 
knowledge workers between firms spreads the knowledge over the economy. However, 
labour mobility also implies that the employer is not able to appropriate the returns of his 
investments in human capital.
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3. Increasing practical importance of human capital
Apart from theoretical grounds, fostering education and training, i.e. workers 
employability can also be motivated on practical grounds. One o f the main differences 
between the labour policies in the major countries is in their attitude towards human 
capital. In theory two efficient equilibriums (economic orders) can be distinguished: a low 
training and high quit equilibrium and a low quit high training equilibrium. Poaching of 
personnel may result in high turnover and a unique economic equilibrium with a better 
allocation of employees over jobs. Such an economy (e.g. the United States) may be less 
efficient because the level of training is relatively low. Since workers and employers cannot 
fully capture returns to investments through higher wages and profitability, they will 
underinvest. An economy where poaching is limited because of dismissal protection or the 
power of works councils (e.g. Germany) the economy may be in equilibrium with much 
training. Theoretically it is impossible to indicate which of the two forces is dominant 
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). This is determined to a significant degree by the structural 
characteristics o f the economy. There is no single peak set of capitalist institutions. No 
economic system is superior every time and everywhere. Preference for an economic system 
depends upon the specific economic environment (Delsen and De Jong 1998; Freeman 
2000).
The increasing interest in employability is connected with technological, organisational, 
economical and demographic developments. Employability refers to the lasting 
deployment of employees or their capacity to obtain and keep jobs. Employability is seen 
as a reply to the increasing uncertainty caused by the degradation o f the social security 
system, internal flexibilisation and the increasingly businesslike relation between 
employer and employee. In the current turbulent environment, individual employees are 
expected to take more responsibilities with regard to their own professional development. 
An active career management directed towards lifelong employability is increasingly 
considered a necessity. Lifelong employability also implies that employers grant their 
employees the opportunity to take this responsibility for their own career. Employers too 
need to invest in training and to offer more variation and customised functions.
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As a result of the reduction in transport and communication costs economic activity 
become foot loose. Increasing competition resulting from the internationalisation of 
economies augments the importance o f human capital as a competitive factor. The 
comparative advantages, which determine the competitive position of a country, are 
determined less and less by traditional factors such as location and presence of raw 
materials and more and more by investments in human capital. Human embodied 
knowledge, human competences, is an important intangible asset that determines a firm’s 
competitive success (see Bailey et al. 1993; Porter 1990). After all, if capital is 
completely mobile, the level o f education o f the labour force is the most prominent 
decisive factor of international trade. Aging and dejuvenation of the labour force imply 
that an increasing number of companies have to acquire knowledge via incumbent 
employees. Continuous education after initial education is necessary for maintaining 
compatibility in the rapidly changing knowledge economy. Young well trained workers 
will become scares. Recruitment as well as poaching o f fresh human capital will become 
more difficult if not impossible. Retraining and training on-the-job of adult workers are 
becoming increasingly important due to these demographic and technological 
developments. Explaining why at present in trade and industry life-long learning is an 
important policy issue. For instance, according to the European Council: “People are 
Europe's main asset and should be the focal point of the Union's policies. Investing in 
people and developing an active and dynamic welfare state will be crucial both to 
Europe's place in the knowledge economy and for ensuring that the emergence of this 
new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, social 
exclusion and poverty.”2
4. Sources of underinvestment in human capital: market failures
Because of market failures schooling and training fail to reach the socially-optimum 
level. Underinvestment of training implies that individuals and enterprises spend less than 
justified by the rate of return on training. An empirical indication for underinvestment in
2 Presidency conclusions Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, Lisbon, point 24.
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training is that the rates of return to training far exceed rates of return to other 
investments (see Stern and Ritzen 1991; Booth and Snower 1996). These market failures 
concern the prisoner's dilemma, free-riding and the hold-up problem, external effects, 
spill-over effects, liquidity constraints and incomplete information (see Figure 1). The 
prisoner's dilemma and the free-rider problem pertain to general training and schooling 
and concern the relationship between employers. In a competitive labour market 
underinvestment occurs, for firms have no incentive to provide training. Training is a 
risky investment: financial returns of general and specific training are uncertain, because 
time horizons are shortened by labour turnover and poaching skills. The positive external 
effects of general training create reticence among employers in training professionals 
themselves because they run the risk that an employee trained by the company will be 
poached after conclusion o f the professional training by another company that does not 
devote (as much) attention to professional training. To reduce the poaching risk, firms 
will not invest in general training in the hope to poach workers trained elsewhere or 
invest in less transferable firm specific training. Although individual employers are 
convinced of the importance of investments in human capital, the training and schooling 
do not materialise because they are caught in a prisoner's dilemma. Thus even though it is 
in the collective interest of businesses to supply training, it is not in the interest of the 
individual businesses to do so because the returns on the investment are uncertain. 
Positive external effects can also result in free-rider problems, because the competitor 
reaps the rewards of the investments in schooling while that competitor does not pay a 
fitting price. In other words, the investing employer is subsidising the competition. The 
prisoner's dilemma and the free-rider behaviour illustrate how the market fails: the 
individual rationality of certain employers is inefficient from the perspective of the 
business sector and society. Ok and Tergeist (2003: 23) conclude that trained workers are 
not more likely to stay in a firm than their non-trained counterparts. This evidence lends 
support to the poaching problem. As a result o f these externalities private and social 
benefits o f training do not coincide and underprovision o f training occurs. When the 
businesses that need the same type of skilled workers do not consult with one another, the 
ultimate result will be that there will be no schooling.
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Figure 1: Market failures and investments in human capital
Prisoners dilemma
a ---------------------►
Firm 1 Free-rider problem Firm 2
< ---------------------►
The hold-up problem is related to contract renegotiation and pertains to company specific 
human capital and concern the relationship between the employer and the employee in 
the same company. Also firm-specific training is a risky investment for both employee 
and employer and underinvestment occurs. Employees that have invested in (specific) 
human capital may be deceived by the employer that does not pay the higher wage after 
the investment. Inefficient destruction of human capital occurs when an employee leaves 
or is forced to leave the firm. There is no insurance available to protect against this loss 
(Stern an Ritzen 1991). Hence, it may not be the nature of the training that determines 
whether and how much employers pay for training. Company-specific investments not 
only make the employer vulnerable, but also weaken his future negotiation position with 
reference to the employee's wages. Wage negotiations on the business level result in a 
hold-up problem. Due to the uncertainty regarding the division of the surplus in the 
future, employer and employee suspend their specific investment because they expect
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that future wage (re)negotiations about the surplus resulting from business-specific 
investments will rob them of part of the return, because contracts or agreements are 
incomplete. Transaction costs occur. As a result, less is invested in specific training than 
is socially desirable. The market fails. Both parties have an interest in solving this hold­
up problem.
Training an employee not only has an impact on the productivity o f that particular 
worker, but also on the productivity of co-workers, and spill-over effects imply a positive 
impact of training on the productivity in other firms. Also liquidity constraints and 
limitation o f borrowing by the employee are market failures causing underinvestment in 
general and specific training (Booth and Snower 1996; Leuven 2005). Firms have more 
possibilities to pool the risks in the returns to specific training than individual workers. 
Workers have fewer means to pool the risks in the returns to general training. Payback 
clauses in individual contracts or collective agreements encourage firms to undertake the 
cost associated with training programs and impose a penalty on workers who quit within 
a certain period. They reduce the risk o f poaching for the employer and permit sharing of 
costs of training even in the presence of serious individual credit constraints by de facto 
borrowing from their employer. The application of pay-back clauses may be limited 
because of problems o f contractibility of training contents (see OECD 2003). Payback 
clauses require certification.
Not only incomplete contracts, also incomplete information may explain underinvestment 
in training by both employer and employee. Good information is a condition sine qua non 
for efficient investment decisions (Stern and Ritzen 1991). Lack of contractibility of 
training content and quality prevent an efficient sharing of the costs of and the benefits 
from training partly explain under-provision. Completion of training often does not lead 
to certification. Certification of skills increases transferability o f skills and hence labour 
mobility, for it reduces asymmetric information, and represents a disincentive to train for 
firms. However, if certification improves the effort put into training by the worker it may 
be in the interest of firms to invest in certified-skills acquisitions. Moreover certification 
of acquired skills may induce trainees to contribute to the cost of investing in training,
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because of the higher returns they can reap in the labour market. For the recruiting firm it 
takes time and money to assess the value of the training. The transaction costs involved in 
signalling to other employers the outcome o f general training indicates market failure. 
Transaction costs may also result from the fact that employees have insufficient 
information on the value of their investment in general human capital for the employer. 
The introduction o f transaction costs implies that the specificity o f the training depends 
on circumstances other than the nature of the training alone. In an imperfect market 
specific training also includes all those types o f training for which the transaction costs 
are higher than the benefits of moving to another firm. These transaction costs include 
selling and buying a house etc. Stern and Ritzen (1991) consider training to be specific if 
the difference between the value of that training in other firms and the value in the firm 
of training is smaller over a longer period of time than the transaction costs of moving.
Investment in general training may not fully be transformed into a higher wage, due to 
asymmetric information. Other employers are not fully able to observe the quantity and 
quality of the investment in human capital. This monopolistic situation allows the 
employer to invest in general training o f his employees, for he can appropriate part of the 
productivity gains. The information asymmetry between the training firm and outside 
employers renders general training thus effectively specific (Leuven 2005: 103). 
Moreover training firms may be better informed about the abilities o f its workers giving 
rise to adverse selection. This adverse selection dampens the response o f market wages to 
human capital investments. Low-ability workers will leave the training firm. The best 
workers are trained and retained.
Human capital, i.e. continuous education and training (CET), is heterogeneous and 
difficult to measure (OECD 1996; Ok and Tergeist 2003; Borghans et al. 2001). In 
practice training has a mixed character: it contains general and specific elements or is 
relevant for a limited number of firms. General and specific training are complementary 
and are difficult to separate (OECD 1991: 137). Markets fail to provide training because 
of this complementarity between general and specific training; substantial turnover of 
labour reduces the payoff to general as well as specific training. The mixed character
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implies that employees can not appropriate the complete return of their investment in 
training on the labour market. It discourages investment in general training by the 
employee. Also employers invest too little in training because the general component of 
the employee training causes positive external effects: a poaching firm can obtain part of 
the surplus o f the shared training investment by the employee and the training firm. The 
positive external effect moreover increases the leave option o f the employees. Partly as a 
result of transferable skills there is under-provision o f formal training, despite some 
market power of employers to appropriate part of the benefits from training (OECD 
2003).
In the neoclassical theory the productivity-age and wage-age curves coincide. According 
to the human capital theory young employees at the start of their career and employers 
invest a lot in human capital. This investment can only pay itself back if the productivity 
increases faster than the wage. This leads to young employees earning a wage that is 
higher than their productivity, while older employees are rewarded below their 
productivity. This may induce shirking. The age-earnings curve of trained persons is 
steeper than that of untrained persons, the difference being greater the greater the 
investment (Stern and Ritzen 1991). According to the contract theory, however, the wage 
of young employees lies below their productivity and the wage of older employees lies 
above their productivity. The younger employees ‘subsidise’ the older employees. For the 
employer, in theory, this is without cost consequences, but it does generate a commitment 
from both the younger as well as the older employees. Both will apply themselves: the 
younger employee has a lot to gain by staying with the company for a long time and the 
older employee has a lot to lose in case of dismissal. The implicit contract is also a 
solution to the hold-up problem and encourages investment in company-specific human 
capital. In western economies age-productivity-wage profiles are in accordance with the 
contract theory (see Skirbekk 2003).
According to Becker (1964) employees pay for general on-the-job training by receiving 
wages below what they could receive elsewhere. However, this is seldom the case. 
Empirical results show the opposite: relative to the marginal productivity higher in stead
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of lower start salaries and in general the employees pay little of nothing for their general 
training. Most continuous vocational training (CVT) is entirely paid by employers. This 
is at odds with the human capital theory (OECD 1994: 146; OECD 2003: 246-247; 
Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; 1999). This implies very high returns to general training for 
employees. For employers the rate of return must be lower, for they pay all or most of the 
costs. Hence the social rate of return is higher than the rate of returns for employers, who 
control the amount of general training provided, explaining underinvestment of general 
training in practice.
5. Industrial relations to overcome market failures
Training cannot be left to the market. Market failures imply undersupply of training and 
that without intervention in training competitiveness of firms and the rate of economic 
growth will suffer. Moreover, the market alone cannot assure an equal opportunity for all 
categories of workers (OECD 1994: 146; Ok and Tergeist 2003: 28).
Central collective agreements make training and other skill-upgrading arrangements 
easier while offering unions the possibility o f trading between wages and schooling or 
other matters, including working conditions and job opportunities for weaker groups on 
the labour market (‘good causes’) (Delsen 2002). Also the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) concludes that without some institutional 
arrangements such as strong unions or employer organisations, workers and firms often 
will not be able to generate the best arrangements on training investment (OECD 1991: 
137; OECD 1994: 145-158). Unions may encourage training by improving the 
commitment on wage contracts and reducing the hold-up problem, by reducing labour 
turnover, by reducing wages between trained and un-trained employees and by 
internalising poaching externalities. Brunello and De Paola (2004) conclude from their 
literature review that empirical research on the relationship between training incidence 
and union coverage in collective bargaining and union density produces mixed results.
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Research performed by the OECD (1997: 130) shows that job uncertainty as perceived by 
the employees is significantly lower in countries where the level o f coverage of collective 
negotiations is higher and in countries with central negotiations about employment 
conditions. These last two in turn reflect the ability of unions to protect employees 
against uncertainty. Anglo-Saxon countries with more decentralised negotiations show a 
higher uncertainty figure. This has a detrimental impact on the training effort of 
employees and employers. In a deregulated labour market -  for instance the United 
Kingdom and the United States -  where the company is the dominant negotiation level, it 
is more cost effective for employers to poach skills from their competitors than to invest 
in training their own personnel (see Soskice et al. 1998; Gospel and Foreman 2006). This 
can nevertheless only happen without detrimental effect if and when the individual 
employees sufficiently train themselves. However, in a decentralised, uncertain labour 
market, employees will not be willing to do so. Schooling and training fail to reach the 
socially-optimum level as a result. The greater perceived job uncertainty, the higher 
personnel turnover, the limited possibilities for individual employers to force their 
employees to remain in their jobs and the minimisation of schooling costs explain the 
lower expenditures for general training by businesses as well as the limited attention for 
the quality o f company training in the United Kingdom and in the United States (see 
Acemoglu en Pischke 1998; Layard et al. 1994; Lynch 1994; Prais 1995).
Lack of information is a fundamental obstacle to a smooth functioning of markets for 
further training. Information for employers and employees about the availability cost and 
quality of training might be provided through employers’ organisations, trade unions. As 
employers and employees are well informed about the current skill needs, collective 
labour agreements also represent a guarantee for the labour market relevancy o f the 
schooling, and better address the issues o f who is entitled to the training and what rights 
they have (duration, reimbursement, type o f schooling) (Delsen 2002; Addison and 
Belfield 2004). Works council involvement could increase efficiency o f further training 
by reducing asymmetric information on costs and benefits, building trust and facilitating 
worker co-operation (Ok and Tergeist 2003: 32 and 41-42; Zwick 2006). However, 
decentralised training decisions limit the opportunity for coordination and the
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development of national or sectoral training policies. Market failures may occur. This 
may explain why in the OECD member countries related to training an increase dialogue 
is recorded, while industrial relations show a decentralisation o f bargaining (Ok and 
Tergeist 2003: 38-39).
Cooperation on the branch and sector levels and agreements on a level that is higher than 
the company level can prevent the prisoner's dilemma and the free-rider problem from 
causing training and schooling to stagnate at a sub-optimum level. Recent case studies 
evidence in the UK indeed shows that employers’ cooperation prevents the prisoner's 
dilemma and free-riding and has a positive effect on both the quality and the quantity of 
training (Gospel and Foreman 2006). Also collective labour agreements, the mandatory 
extension of collective labour agreements as well as collective financing of company 
training could be solutions to both the prisoner's dilemma and the free-rider problem, and 
could therefore prevent these sources o f market failure (Delsen 2002). In theory this 
could combat both overinvestment and underinvestment in company training. General 
training can be stimulated by collective labour agreements concerning schooling that is 
not directly related to the position held. The legal extension o f provisions in collective 
agreements to all employers in the industry prevents unorganised employers from 
poaching trained employees because it does away with wage competition. The fact that 
training is obligatory for the entire business sector stimulates employers to invest in 
human capital. An industry training system also implies that diplomas are universally 
accepted, making it easier for employees to change employers. This promotes the 
external job mobility. It stimulates employees to participate in the company training. 
However apart from market failure, also institutional failure may be a source of 
inefficient investments in human capital. For instance, levies and compulsory investment 
schemes may encourage inefficient and inappropriate training. Large enterprises benefit 
disproportionally from such schemes (Booth and Snower 1996; Ok and Tergeist 2003).
Collective financing prevents free-rider behaviour and stimulates use of the training 
opportunities by both employers and employees. Joint governance o f collective training 
funds by the social partners decreases the marginal schooling costs for employers and
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makes the number o f available training slots less sensitive to the business cycles. It also 
reduced poaching externalities, notwithstanding their potential and actual shortcomings 
(Ok and Tergeist 2003). By pooling resources economies o f scale and scope in the 
provision o f training could be generated.3 Collectively-financed schooling funds can also 
compensate for the segmentation trends on the labour market and improve the 
distribution of training opportunities. Collective labour agreements can move training 
from the category ‘bonus’ into the category of ‘rights’. This is particularly important for 
the weaker groups on the labour market, including the lower skilled and older employees. 
Because o f market failures demand and supply of training are insufficient for these 
groups. It can also improve access to training funds for smaller businesses (Delsen 2002; 
Ok and Tergeist 2003; OECD 2003). From actual practice in the OECD countries it is 
evident that consultation institutions and the training funds have been unable to close the 
training gap between small and large businesses. The unequal participation in company 
training has not disappeared, either. Employees with a low educational level, older 
employees, women, part-time employees and flex-workers participate relatively less in 
CET. This may be efficient, for the period to amortise the costs of training may be too 
short for both employer and employee (see Ok and Tergeist 2003). Better educated 
individuals are more involved in both general and specific training (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1998; Brunello and De Paola 2004). Also this is efficient for early learning 
begets later learning; there is complementarity between education and training. Skill 
acquired early make later learning easier. More able people find learning easier; ability 
and training are complements (Becker 1964; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Heckman 
2000). Formal education is often less efficient than training provided by firms (see Stern 
and Ritzen 1991). Heckman (2000) concludes that efforts should be made to shift training 
subsidies to the private sector. Private training programmes will train workers who are 
likely to benefit most, and they can tailor their training programmes to market needs. For 
vulnerable groups in the labour market employment promotion, i.e. learning while 
working is more efficient than training programmes in the public sector.
3 Economies of scale exist when the average cost of a firm decreases as production increases. 
Economies of scope exist if unit costs are decreased as the variety of products produced increases.
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Coordinated or solidaristic industrial relations are an incentive for firms to undertake 
workforce training for two reasons: labour turnover is lower and finding trained 
employees outside is costlier. Coordination o f training investment as well as mandatory 
training solves the free-ride problem. Lower wage dispersion is an incentive for firms to 
upgrade the skills o f the workforce (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), for it allows firms to 
appropriate the difference between the marginal productivity of the skilled workers and 
the wage; wage dispersion diminishes the rent from training that the firm can appropriate 
and discourages investment in training. Wage compression might be induced by a 
minimum wage or union wage bargaining. This is in sharp contract with Becker’s 
analysis. Increased profits due to imperfect labour markets (compressed wage structure) 
imply that the supply of training by firms is higher than in perfect competition. The lower 
wage gain from training implies that the demand for training by employees is lower than 
in perfect competition. The impact on demand is stronger than the impact on supply, 
because the employer gains only if  the employee stays in that firm, i.e. there are 
externalities (Stevens 1999: 23).
As returns of relation-specific investments are lost if the relationship is terminated, the 
resulting hold-up problem, may be avoided by the provision of job security, explicit 
dismissal rules or a long-term work contract. However, it may also lead to lower effort. 
The hold-up problem may be avoided by a large enough rent and rent sharing and by 
implicit contracts that reduce shirking. These conclusions are derived from theoretical 
models that rely on perfect rational individuals (Anderhub, Konigstein and Kubler 2003). 
The hold-up problem may also be solved by reputation mechanisms, i.e. the firm gets a 
reputation for rewarding skill collection. A good reputation will keep employers from 
behaving opportunistic concerning his employees (see Leuven 2005; Brunello and De 
Paola 2004).
Another solution to the hold-up problem can be found in defining the wage level for the 
future at the beginning o f the labour relationship. As a result, the need for future 
negotiations is removed. Fixed wage scales, however, have limitations. If  the contract 
wage level is lower than elsewhere, the employee may leave, or when the costs are higher
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than the costs of replacement, termination looms. Modification of the contract is in the 
best interest of both parties, because otherwise the relationship may be unilaterally 
terminated. Re-negotiations nevertheless result in the hold-up problem. There is no 
optimum situation. The best wage contract is therefore a contract that minimizes the 
chance o f re-negotiations. This is a contract that specifies the wage level for the majority 
of the cases. If a contract of this type is to apply for a longer period, it must be possible to 
modify the wage level to the changing macro-economic conditions. If  this is done 
through re-negotiations, the hold-up problem once again comes into play. This is where 
corporatist organisations can play a part. Negotiations about contract modifications are 
delegated to organisations on a higher aggregation level. Coordinated wage negotiations 
between employers and employees on a level higher than the company are a solution to 
this hold-up problem (see Soskice et al. 1998; Teulings and Hartog 1998). As a result, an 
individual employer and his employee can bypass the hold-up problem because they 
cannot influence the outcome of the negotiations by suspending their specific 
investments. The wage negotiations are uncoupled from the daily employment situation. 
The legal extension o f collective labour agreements plays an explicit part: the hold-up 
problem for new employees is prevented by determining the wage level prior to the 
employment, by means o f mandatory extension to all businesses in a sector. In theory, 
this could combat both overinvestment and underinvestment in company training.
6. Investments in human capital in business administrations
In market economies the financial accounting and reporting systems of training and 
labour force qualifications provide incomplete information; better information contributes 
to transparency and predictability and improves the efficiency and effectiveness of 
decision making. There is a gap between theory and practice. Most businesses do not 
treat the expenses for company training in their accounts as an investment in a capital 
good, as an asset, but as ‘out of the pocket expenses’ (like the cost of heating), meaning 
that expenditure and costs coincide. Regardless of the period over which an enterprise 
expects to enjoy the benefits of training. It also means that further training has no 
identifiable consequence for an enterprise’s balance sheet. Despite its investment
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character, the training costs are registered in full in the profit and loss account in the 
period in which they are incurred. As a result, in the short term an investment in human 
capital by the employer renders a cost disadvantage in comparison to competitors. This 
makes investments in human capital extremely more fragile and sensitive to economic 
cycles than investments in physical capital.
Economic and financial barriers are a reality. The government could stimulate training 
and schooling by companies financially by means o f levies, spending requirements, 
grants, subsidies, vouchers and fiscal facilitation and reduce poaching by taxation. Co­
financing is a better tool for the provision of adequate incentives to employers and 
training providers than full financing (see OECD 2003; Brunello and De Paola 2004). 
Institutional arrangements favouring cost sharing among private parties are important to 
foster training. Also improved information on training courses and training wages 
improve the efficiency of the training market (Stern and Ritzen 1991).
A more fundamental approach is to capitalise training costs and to introduce depreciation 
instead of regarding training costs as operational ‘out of the pocket’ costs. This also 
requires changes to existing reporting conventions in management accounting and 
financial accounting (OECD 1994: 149; OECD 1996). The enterprise could reflect its 
training investment as an asset, based on the cost of training or some valuation o f the 
knowledge or competences acquired in further training, to be depreciated over the useful 
life o f the training. If a trained employee left, the un-depreciated value of that asset would 
be written off against income. This will not necessary result in more training by 
enterprises, it would potentially improve the transparency o f apparent training costs, by 
spreading these over the time in which further training provides benefits. These benefits 
depend on the time the training remains useful, and hence on the depreciation and 
obsolescence rate of the training over time. By ensuring that the results o f training 
expenditure is reflected in the enterprise’s balance sheet it provides transparent 
justification for pursuing human resource management strategies aimed at protecting 
those assets from being poached away (OECD 1994: 149).
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One often mentioned reason why human capital is not activated on any balance sheet - 
exceptions to this rule are football clubs like Ajax Amsterdam - is related to the fact that 
the production factor labour is not owned by the firm. However, putting human capital as 
an asset on the balance sheet does not imply that people degenerate to machines or a 
livestock, nor that people are depreciated, neither the introduction of slavery as is often 
suggested in business economic literature. The accounting profession also points towards 
difficulties in measuring the value of and establishing transferable title to human capital 
that make it difficult to introduce accounting standards that allow human capital to be 
treated as an asset in financial reporting (see e.g. OECD 1996: 43 and 91). Activating 
human capital on the balance sheet does imply that knowledge and skills of employees 
are actually seen as capital goods, as assets and are treated accordingly in the 
accountancy. That is like real investment and that periodically depreciation is applied. 
This depreciation represents the reduction in value because of economic obsolescence as 
a result of technological development. The established depreciation fund has to be large 
enough to bring and keep up to the mark again the obsolete knowledge of the personnel. 
The essential question is whether future cash inflows are likely to be large enough to 
warrant making the investment. With that is achieved that the education and training 
expenditure are expressed in the period in which the benefits are realised stemming from 
these spending. From this the management obtains a better picture of the results and 
probably the management decision concerning investment in human capital will improve. 
This links up better with the way companies process durable tangible assets like 
buildings, machinery and means of transport in the annual accounts. For as a rule these 
are activated and depreciated, making it easier to spend wealth on such assets like 
schooling and training. Present and future benefits of physical capital are made 
comparable through the use of discount rates, while costs are measured through 
depreciation. However, this also requires changes to existing conventions in management 
accounting and financial accounting. The government could stimulate this transition 
towards depreciation of training by means of financial incentives. The introduction of 
investment premiums or investment tax deductions is relevant here to stimulate the 
education and training expenditure of trade and industry in a particular direction.
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In the case of human capital counting costs or benefits over any period of time does not 
apply, only in the immediate accounting period. Is physical and human capital so 
different to justify the very large differences in treatment under financial and reporting 
practices? Four conditions must be met for human capital to be treated as an asset (OECD 
1996: 44): human capital must be measurable (output potential); fruits o f investments in 
human capital can be appropriated by the investor; costs (rental; buying) of human capital 
must be objectively determinable; recognition of estimates of value of output potential of 
human capital investments by labour market and capital market. The first two obstacles to 
parallel treatment of physical and human capital are not insurmountable. Condition 3 
(costing) and 4 (market recognition) are contingent on conditions 1 and 2. The key issue 
is appraisal, not the intrinsic nature of human capital as intangible (OECD 1996: 46). The 
problem than is to create an inter-temporal market when the asset cannot be sold as a 
separate commodity. This starts with prior recognition o f output potential o f specific 
human competences. Record-keeping conventions and operational decisions by 
individuals, firms and governments play a major part in determining whether or not 
conditions 3 and 4 can be met in ways that establish the inter-temporal asset status of 
human capital (OECD 1996: 52). Hence there are solutions to the problems related to the 
parallel treatment of human and physical capital in accounting.
7. Investments in human capital in government budgets
In public finance there is no or too little attention for the wealth position of the national 
state. Investments in physical and human capital are sacrificed for the sake of reducing 
government budget deficit or reducing government debt. This one-sidedness is partly the 
result of the applied administrative scheme. Many governments use cash not accrual 
accounting methods. The present government budget and account only look at the year in 
which the cash effect occurs, i.e. the actual spending takes place. In other words the 
expenditure and the receipts are imputed to the period in which the actual expenditure 
and receipts occurred. The scheme is focused on the short term and does not offer insight 
into the long-term impact of the policy. Unlike the practice in trade and industry all 
investment expenditure on physical capital are included in the budget of the year in which
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the decision was taken. As capital goods are expensive and high costs imply losses, these 
spending often lose out on consumption expenditure in case o f cut backs. Accrual 
accounting is the way to engage in inter-temporal calculation and valuation of training 
and labour force qualifications and to inter-temporal human capital investment decision 
making. When applying the accountancy custom (matching in accrual accounting) used 
in the private sector related to physical capital the annual expenditure amount is lower. 
The introduction of the capital account will imply that the profits and losses of an 
investment are attributed to the year they concern. In accrual accounting revenues are 
recorded when realised and expenses are recorded when incurred, without regard for the 
time of cash receipt or payment, and the matching of revenues realised with the costs 
expired (expenses) (OECD 1996: 38).
This once again underlines the desirability of re-introducing the division between the 
current account and the capital account (capital budget) of the government budget. The 
current account (current budget) contains current income (tax receipts) and current 
expenditure (consumption expenditure, including salaries and annual interest burden and 
annual depreciation). The balance o f the current account determines the change in state 
capital during a given year. The current account can be compared to the profit and loss 
account of any private enterprise. The capital account can be compared to the system of 
gains and losses, in which depreciation represents the debiting as the depreciation of 
possessions as a result of economical or technical wear, even though this depreciation 
does not entail immediate expenditure. By the time the capital goods have been written 
down, the loan has been redeemed and new investment goods can be purchased with the 
loan. The capital account contains expenditure (acquisition o f investment goods) and 
capital revenue (sale of capital goods and shares), which lead to a change in the 
composition of state capital. On the current account, expenditure is in principle covered 
by current income. The government is allowed to take out loans for the benefit o f the 
capital account. The underlying thought is that future government investments would 
result in revenue or sustainable use (such as dikes and roads) and could therefore be 
financed via future expenditure (interest payments and repayments).
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The introduction o f the capital account will provide government investments with 
improved protection against cutbacks. There is a risk that expenditure important to the 
social-economic structure but not regarded as investments will be pressurised if loans are 
only permissible for expenditure on the capital account. Examples include expenditure on 
education and training (human capital) and social security expenditure aimed at 
encouraging harmonious social relationships (social capital: social relationships, norms 
and values). On the other hand, ministers could as a result attempt to have their 
expenditure viewed as investments in order to avoid cutbacks. Society benefits from 
stable labour relations. The capital budget shows that government spending often results 
in the acquisition of durable productive capital and thus is valuable to society's welfare.
8. Conclusions and recommendations
Bookkeeping practice within enterprises and government budgets and policies concerning 
education and training differ considerably from the human capital theory, the human 
resource management theory as well as from endogenous growth theory. In their decision 
making and accounting practice not only private enterprises, also national governments 
treat education and training like consumption goods (costs) and not like investment goods 
(assets). Underinvestment in training by the individuals, the firms as well as the 
governments is the result. Fostering workers' employability requires changes in the in the 
way education and training and retraining (human capital) are treated in bookkeeping and 
government budgets. Also consultative institutions are an important solutions to market 
failure and improving the scope, the participation, the content and the quality of company 
training and therefore for the competitive strength and the growth of an economy.
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